Announcement: FCIL-SIS (Informal) Book Discussion Group at AALL Annual Meeting

By Dan Wade

disarray_0The FCIL-SIS Book Discussion Group will meet at the Annual Meeting on Monday between 12:15 and 2:00p.m. We are gathering at the AALL Annual Meeting Registration Desk at 12:15p.m.

The book under discussion this year is A World in Disarray, by Richard Haass (New York: Penguin, 2017). Haass has been President of the Council of Foreign Relations since 2003. After graduating from Oberlin and receiving his M.Phil and D.Phil from Oxford, Haass worked for the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Between 2001 and 2003 he served the George W. Bush Administration by assuming the dual role of Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, where he became a close adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell, and United States Special Envoy for Northern Ireland, for which he received the Department of State’s Distinguished Service Award. The book under discussion is Haass’ twelfth book, and it very much follows the line of thinking set out in probably his best known work, The Reluctant Sheriff,  in which he writes, “what will prove crucial is the ability of the United States to persuade others to adopt and abide by its preferences—and the will and ability of the United States to act as sheriff, to mobilize itself and others to insist on them when resistance emerges.” (p.44). In the present book he mellows some and invokes the principle of sovereign obligation, where a state works towards meeting the interests of other states. In the final chapter he addresses the issue of our country in disarray. (No, it is not about Donald Trump’s foreign policy.) Here he calls for more military spending. You can imagine how that analysis sits with this Connecticut Yankee and ordained minister (emeritus) of a historic peace church, e.g., Friends and Mennonites. The book does have value. I thought the discussion of R2P and United States debt were two of the high points.

I believe our group will be smaller this year, and if you are interested in foreign policy, world order, and international relations, please feel free to join us, even if you haven’t read the book. I will reserve a couple of extra places at the lunch table.

Cuban Law and Legal Research: A Snapshot During the Deshielo (Congelado?) – Monday, July 17, 2017, 9:45 a.m., Austin Convention Center, Room 18AB

By Julienne Grant

IMG_9721 (003)“The history of the United States and Cuba encompass[es] revolution and conflict, struggle and sacrifice, retribution and now reconciliation. It is time now for us to leave the past behind. It is time for us to look forward to the future together.”

-President Barack Obama, March 22, 2016, Havana, Cuba

 

“Therefore, effective immediately, I am canceling the last administration’s completely one-sided deal with Cuba.” 

-President Donald J. Trump, June 16, 2017, Miami, Florida

 

“Again, the United States Government resorts to coercive methods of the past, adopting measures to intensify the blockade, in force since February 1962, which not only causes damage and deprivation to the Cuban people and constitutes an undeniable obstacle to the development of our economy, but also affects the sovereignty and interests of other countries, inciting international rejection.” (Julienne E. Grant, translation)

-Declaration of the Revolutionary Government, June 16, 2017, Havana, Cuba

 

When I drafted a proposal last fall for an AALL program on Cuba, I envisioned a continuation of the dramatic deshielo (thaw) of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. Specifically, I assumed there would be a progression of the rapprochement that former President Obama alluded to in his speech in Havana on March 22, 2016.  What I didn’t foresee while crafting the program were the most recent proclamations by President Trump and the Cuban government.  Trump’s June 16th announcement in Miami that backtracks some of the previous administration’s initiatives has halted the thaw a bit. As such, this program is perhaps more appropriately a snapshot during the deshielo congelado (frozen thaw). However U.S.-Cuba relations can now be characterized, though, Cuba is on the cusp of dramatic changes, and it’s a hot topic.

Please join Dr. Marisol Florén-Romero (Florida International University), Teresa Miguel-Stearns (Yale), and me (Loyola University Chicago) as we first explore this enigmatic jurisdiction from a law librarian’s perspective. Our program will include a brief overview of the somewhat unwieldly nomenclature of Cuban law, as well as a short assessment of English-language sources that can provide insight into Cuba’s legal landscape. In addition, Teresa will offer a quick summary of her experience purchasing legal materials in Havana last year.  Accompanying the program is a useful 26-page handout that will be available for download.

Our featured speaker, however, is Professor Jorge R. Piñon, whose talk is titled “Cuba Business Scenarios:  Challenges and Opportunities,” certainly a timely topic in what is an extremely fluid political and economic environment.   Professor Piñon is the Interim Director of The University of Texas at Austin, Center for International Energy & Environmental Policy, and the Director of its Latin America & Caribbean Energy Program.

Professor Piñon is also recognized as an expert on Cuba’s energy sector, as well as on the island’s future economic transitional challenges and opportunities.  He is an advisor and a member of the Cuba Task Force at The Brookings Institution and co-author of “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

Hope to see you on Monday for what is sure to be a lively, engaging, and enlightening hour!

 

The Social Responsibilities Special Interest Section Carbon Offset Project: Making a Difference in Global Climate Change

By Erin Gow

As the AALL 2017 conference approaches and you mark your calendars for all the great FCIL related sessions and events taking place in Austin this year, why not take a moment to consider contributing to the Social Responsibilities Special Interest Section Carbon Offset Project? This is a great opportunity to come together with librarians from other sections across AALL to make an international difference.

Climate change is a truly global issue, with international laws and treaties addressing a range of environmental issues that must be tackled beyond the borders of any single nation. This year the SR-SIS is providing an opportunity for everyone to make a difference to the international crisis of climate change by making a donation of just $6 to offset the carbon impact of travelling to the 2017 AALL conference. In addition to making a difference by offsetting carbon emissions, this year’s project also has a direct impact on the lives of people in Uganda, by providing cook stoves that are safer and cleaner than the toxic fires many families currently have to rely on to cook their meals. Visit www.aallnet.org/sections/sr/projects/Travel-Offset-Project.html to find out more about the project and to make a donation.

SR-SIS

Schedule of FCIL Events in Austin

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Hello FCIL-SIS!  Are you ready for Austin next month?  We certainly are!

As we approach the 2017 AALL Annual Meeting in Austin, we encourage you to keep an eye on the blog and to follow us on Twitter for coverage of FCIL-SIS programming both during and after the conference.  

Also, PLEASE consider volunteering to recap a program (or two).  The recaps are super helpful for readers unable to attend the Conference (and for those of us who rely on recaps posted in the blog archives to refresh our dismal memories!).  If you are interested in volunteering to recap any of the events listed below, please contact Loren Turner (lturner@umn.edu) or Alyson Drake (alyson.drake@ttu.edu).

FCIL-SIS Events

2017 AALL ANNUAL MEETING, AUSTIN

Saturday, July 15

5:00 pm – 6:30 pm: Exhibit Hall Ribbon-Cutting/Opening Reception. Stop by the FCIL-SIS exhibit board!

Sunday, July 16

7:45 am – 8:45 am: FCIL-SIS Electronic Resources Interest Group Meeting (ACC Room 8B)

9:00 am – 10:15 am: Opening General Session (ACC-Grand Ballroom D-G)

11:30 am – 12:30 pm: Global Energy Law: Perspectives from North America and Africa (ACC Room 18AB)

1:00 pm – 2:15 pm: FCIL-SIS Jurisdictions Interest Group Joint Meeting (ACC Room 4C)

5:15 pm – 6:15 pm: FCIL-SIS Foreign Selectors Interest Group Meeting (ACC Room 7)

6:15 pm – 6:45 pm: FCIL-SIS Standing Committees Joint Meeting (Hilton Room 402)

Monday, July 17

7:00 am – 8:30 am: Business Meeting (Hilton Room 400)

9:45 am – 10:45 am: Cuban Law and Legal Research: A Snapshot during the Deshielo (ACC Room 18AB)

3:30 pm – 4:30 pm: FCIL-SIS Teaching Foreign & International Legal Research Interest Group Meeting (ACC Room 5B)

4:45 pm – 5:45 pm: FCIL-SIS Schaffer Grant Presentation: Rosemarie Rogers presents: I am the River and the River is Me  (ACC Room 8C)

6:00 pm – 7:00 pm: International Attendees Joint Reception (Hilton Governor’s Ballroom Salon B)

Tuesday, July 18

7:30 am – 8:15 am: FCIL-SIS Education Committee Meeting (Hilton Room 404)

 

austin

#IALL2016 Recap: Precedent and Authority: the Continental Dimension

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By: Jim Hart

Professor Ibbetson began with the point that precedent has not always been a part of English law and has been more a part of Continental law than we think.  He explained that historically, in general, common law precedent focused on law as it was applied in court whereas civil law precedent focused on the principles and rules in the codes.

He began with England because here we’re on fairly familiar and firm ground. Before the nineteenth century there was no strict rule of bindingness and no structure by which courts were only bound by courts above them.  This is not surprising because it was only in the nineteenth century that we began to get enough regular, reliable reports and a clear hierarchy of courts to think of precedents binding on lower courts.

It was only in the seventeenth century that changes in the direction of the modern ways of thinking began to occur.   And it wouldn’t surprise anybody, especially after hearing Professor Baker’s lecture, that a central figure in this process was Sir Edmund Coke.  We need to address three closely related, but separate phenomena.  The first was the practice of following previous cases.  Although this was not new and it probably goes back as far as we think there was a common law system, it became more intense with high quality reports.  It’s probably hard for us to think of the common law without this since we expect judges to act consistently and English law had nothing like the books and rules of Roman law.

The second phenomenon was the development of the idea of authority. Professor Ibbetson paused a minute here before saying something more about it.  Naturally King had authority, sheriff had authority in his county, the bailiff in his bailiwick and so on.  From the late 15th century we begin to see that some texts were considered to have authority, which must mean that they contained rules that had to be followed, just as the instructions of King, sheriff or bailiff.  As the sixteenth century progressed we find it more normal to say that these texts were authority and being authority was something different from having authority. The only books that were authority, of course, were law books.  And increasingly there was a strong focus on decided cases that had been authorities.  I suspect that the development of the idea of authority at that time was related to the differences between Plowden and Dyer’s methods and those of the Year Books although Professor Ibettson did not say so.

And thirdly there was precedent.  Many lawyers had been familiar with precedent having prepared formal documents such as precedents of pleading.  In the early seventeenth century we find special status being given to judicial precedent, that is decided cases and, in particular, decided cases where the reasons had been recorded.  Just as we would say today that judicial rulings and decided cases as precedents were authorities.

This judicial authority developed from the theory of argument by dialectic, which would have been familiar to anyone from a medieval university.  At this time nearly any text could be authoritative.  But there were two categories of authority: necessary and probable.  The best example of a necessary authority was the Bible which was true by definition and any conclusion drawn from it was equally true as long as the argument was validly drawn from premise to conclusion.  Probable authorities were things that were not true in themselves, but might be true.  It was not what learned men said that constituted probable authority, but things like moralizing fables, popular sayings, and customary ways of doing things.  This is the world of the medieval university on the continent and in England.  In the early 16th century, perhaps first in Holland, a specifically legal dialectic began to appear about how to frame a forensic argument.  The argument from authority is the strongest in law (argumentum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege), wrote one commentator.  The authorities that formed the basis of the argument might be necessary or probable.  In the medieval university, the theory of authority was based on a tradition that went back to Cicero.  But dialectic and rhetoric were not miles apart.

There was another classical tradition.  This one was traced not back to Cicero, but to Quintillian. And here we find the Latin term, “praejudicia,” which we can translate as precedents.  We’re not sure what Quintillian meant by this term, but it might have meant things that had been adjudged before, the literal translation of praeiudicia.  In the early sixteenth century it was said that auctoritas and praeiudicia were interchangeable terms. We don’t know which of these ideas of legal dialectic were used in England, but we do know that some were.  Moreover as more common lawyers spent time at university, they would have come across Cicero and Quintillian and would be utterly familiar with the basics of dialectic and rhetoric.  We are sure that Coke was familiar with these precise terms when he was at university.  Coke used these two sources explicitly in his writing. Indeed he peppered his writings with quotations and near quotations on authority and precedent.  Coke was quite clear that these judicial precedents were only probable authority.  Although judicial precedent was only probable, it was authoritative in court.  All other things being equal, they should be followed.  But other things were not always equal. So from about 1700, England had a doctrine of precedent that was rooted in dialectical theory.  Notice that this process began about a hundred years before the period covered by Professor Baker and stretched to about fifty years later.

How different were things on the continent?  At first glance they weren’t very different in theory, but they differed in operation.  The writers on legal dialectic in Holland, Germany or elsewhere in Europe were thinking in terms of their own systems, not at all in terms of the unruly English common law.  So the argument from authority would have been utterly familiar.  To continental lawyers some authorities were necessary, in particular the writings of the Roman jurists.  It was laid down in Justinian’s code that they had the force of legislation.  The medieval jurists were not regarded as necessary authorities, but as probable ones and the same applied to all the modern writers.  The best way to influence a judge was to follow a long line of legal opinion.  But the dominant line of legal opinion might be held to be wrong, especially by an appellate court.  Previous cases were a problem.  Another Roman law text seemed to exclude their significance saying that judgments should be made on the basis of a lex rather than an exemplum.  But previous decisions could be distinguished.  What really mattered with previous decisions was that they came from a particular court that was known for its learning or issued its decisions under the name of the monarch or ruler.  It is tempting to conclude that the mass of citations from Roman law was little more than froth.  What really mattered was the jurisprudence of this court.  But we should resist that temptation.  We should say that the previous case showed the issue behind the mass of citation.  These were all probable authorities according to the writers on dialectic.  And the previous case merely showed what the correct path through all these authorities was.  Courts might look at previous decisions, but their decisions were made according to the true law.  Earlier decisions might help them to understand what law lay behind a complex plethora of authorities cited in a present case.  In England we can say that it was the printing of large numbers of reports that was really central in allowing the increase in the use of precedent in the early seventeenth century.

So do we get case reports in early modern Europe?  We certainly do and lots and lots and lots of them.  In Italy by 1600 there were thirty-two separate volumes of reports printed in very large folio volumes.  There was a real difference between these volumes and those in England.   The English reports included the arguments given in court sometimes together with the decision that had been reached, which allowed the successful arguments to be identified so that later readers could identify the reason for the decision and understand what the case was an authority for.  The continental model was different.  The reason for the decision was constructed by the person producing the volume.  In so far as they could be said to be authority, it was probable authority like all the other forms of legal writing that were being produced.

Although it’s anachronistic to make the comparison, the continental reports had the same authority as the textbooks used to elucidate the law whereas the English reports had far greater authority.  The legal systems of Europe of this time were similar and they were held together by the common Roman law.  Professor Ibbetson said that he didn’t think that it was an exaggeration to say that there was so vast an amount of legal literature on the continent in the sixteenth century that one could probably prove an argument and its opposite from it.  There was a crying need for something like the English doctrine of precedent to cut through all this mass.  A couple of Spaniards even suggested that all foreign law books should be burned.  And we do find something similar to the English doctrine, but, in one crucial respect, not identical to it.  We can begin tracing this in Naples in the 1490s; one of their statutes said that decisions of the Sacrum Concilium, the highest court, were given in the name of the prince.  Thus it was said that it was if the Sacrum Consilium’s judgements had been given by the prince himself, i.e. that they had legislative force.  This appeared in one of the most important collections of decisions.  But it did not apply to the most important court of the Roman Catholic Church, the Roman Rota, a court whose reasoning was worthy of enormous respect.  But its decisions were not given in the name of the pope so they didn’t count as legislation.  However, as the sixteenth century progressed all across Europe, decisions of courts were said to have the force of legislation.

One of the best discussions of this issue comes from early seventeenth century Portugal.  The core rule there was something like that of Naples: decisions of the Senate given in the presence of the King were treated as having legislative force since the king was presumed to have approved them.  But the king was not always present.  So further arguments were needed to bolster up the authority of court decisions.

One very important rule, backed up by a Roman law text, said that a rule of custom might displace a rule of Roman law itself since all law ultimately came from the people.  How could you identify such customs?  Decisions of the local court would suffice to do so provided of course that they had come from a court whose decisions were worthy of respect, effectively from a superior court.  Decisions of the Senate were always more or less acceptable.

European legal systems based on Roman law contained a great deal of probable authority, from many thousands of volumes, some of which were very thick.  But when we see citations to previous cases, they are overwhelmingly drowned out by the noise of commentators.  England had hardly any textbooks, but by the seventeenth century judicial precedents contained almost exclusively probable authority in what was a very small number of reports.  The continental doctrine of precedent, on the other hand, had come about differently.  For there the relevant case law in the judgment was necessary authority, which meant that it created absolutely firm binding rules.  The great advantage in the seventeenth century and today in the English doctrine was that it created a great deal of provisional bindingness.  But it was only the decisions of the House of Lords that produced any binding rules and they were relatively few in number.  On the continent Supreme Court decisions have stronger authority, but they lack the flexibility of the English doctrine.  Their very rigidity prevented them from developing into something like the English doctrine.  The continental doctrine lacked the ability to work over a very long time.

Professor Ibbetson followed with a gracious thank you and we with thundering applause.

 

#IALL2016 Recap: Law Reporting in England 1550-1650

512 The_bookkeeper_by_van_Dijk

By: Jim Hart

After Professor Reynolds presentation, Diversities among Common Law Nations, Emeritus Professor Sir John Baker and Professor David Ibbetson spoke on the historical development of modern precedent and case reporting.  Although the two differ superficially, they are in fact deeply intertwined.  It may be said that they both spring from the same origin: changes in the theory of authority in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Professor Baker began with the origins of case reporting in England, as we know it, between 1550 and 1650.  The story begins at the end of the series of Year Books in 1535.  When Edmund Plowden entered the Middle Temple in 1538, he began compiling reports of cases and continued this practice throughout his career.  These reports were published as Plowden’s Commentaries in 1571. They were the first of the nominate reporters and differed in important respects from the Year Books.

Although the Year Books had been anonymous, Plowden published his Commentaries under his own name.  He had found out that someone had quickly and carelessly copied his notes and intended to publish them.  He was forced to publish them under his name to secure the credit for his assiduous work.  Indeed Plowden felt it necessary to apologize for putting out his reports in his own name.

A more substantive departure from the Year Books is his decision to include only considered decisions (decisions of particular importance that set precedent) in his reports.  Although he copied the Latin so that readers could see the pleadings, he translated them into law French because of the wide-spread doubt that the common law could be expressed satisfactorily in English.

But his greatest departure was recording cases after judgment because this is what the profession wanted.  The Year Books had recorded cases before trial, which is why they had not included many things that we now take for granted.   This is why the Year Books seem so inconclusive.  To the compilers of the Year Books, the judgment was considered legally uninteresting in comparison with the material that preceded it such as the pleadings, the issue, the arguments, etc.  At this time the judicial system was not designed primarily to elicit decisions, but to frame the points that were to be referred to a jury.  Judges’ rulings concerned procedure and were spoken in court so they were not available for copying.  By Plowden’s time things had changed.  The profession wanted to know how and why a case ended as it did.  It seems to me that this is the most important point made in Professor Baker’s talk.  For it was the development of the idea of precedent both on the Continent and in England at this time, as Professor Ibbetson was to explain next, that led to the changes in the legal system that the  profession’s need for a new kind of reporter.

Finally there were two other new, important practice adopted by Powden. Unlike the Year Books, Plowden also consulted those who were involved in the case to ensure accuracy and he included the judgment, which the Year Books could not have done because they reported cases before judgment.  The judgments were set in a different type so they wouldn’t be confused with the reports.

Plowden set a high standard and there was never to be another volume quite like it.  Most of what Plowden included is to be found in today’s reports. Indeed Plowden’s departures from the Year Books were the origin of our view of what a good report should include.  What we now call the judgment includes the judge’s informal statement of the case, the facts of the case, the legal question, the arguments presented in court, references to the authorities, and the reasons for the conclusion.

The second most important point that Professor Baker made, in my opinion, was that there was a continuous line of reporting that began with Plowden and continued through Dyer and Coke.  This line formed the tradition that the future nominate reports continued.

The work of the next reporter, Dyer, was published posthumously.  Sir James Dyer began gathering his reports in the 1530s, before Plowden had begun.  He left his manuscripts to his two nephews who were law students.  The published edition was taken straight from Dyer’s notebooks.  Although it included over a thousand entries, it left a lot out, e.g, cases that might embarrass a living person, cases that Plowden had already covered, and matters too sensitive to make public for reasons of state.  Within twenty-five years of their publication, the notebooks were in the possession of Sir Edmund Coke who cited them often.

It was common for judges to keep jottings in notebooks at this time as aids to memory.  The exception to this was Edmund Coke whose work was published in eight volumes.  He began taking notes in the 1570s and began making them available to others in the next decade.  The earlier notebooks were essentially the story of Coke’s rise in the bar.  Coke embellished and amplified on many of the cases.   In 1616 he was charged with inaccurate reporting and assigned to correct them.  Francis Bacon volunteered to help with the task.  In the very next year Bacon was made Lord Chancellor and banned Coke from Westminster.  He did, however, put forward a proposal to hire three lawyers to report on the cases at Westminster at a salary of £100 a year.  Although there were never more than two reporters, Bacon had revived the old custom.  He appointed lawyers to do the reporting because they did a better job than judges.  Before the reports were published, the reporters checked with the judges.  Bacon’s scheme continued Coke’s reports up to 1619 when there was a hiatus in reporting until 1621.

This presentation outlines the origins of the nominate reporters and our own systems of law reporting.  But many of them are still in manuscript form.  As the summary of Professor Baker’s presentation states, “Law reporting was to remain a matter of private initiative until the end of the eighteenth century, and many of the best reports…have still not been published.  Anyone seeking to trace the evolution of a legal doctrine or practice before about 1700 must regard manuscript reports as an essential recourse.”

#IALL2016 Recap: Humans as Service? Regulating Work in the Sharing Economy

Employment in the Shring Economy

By: Charles Bjork

Session Six of IALL’s 35rd annual course on international law and legal information in Oxford featured a talk by Associate Professor Jeremias Prassl of the Oxford University Law Faculty on the following topic: Humans as a Service?  Regulating Work in the Sharing Economy.

Professor Prassl began by describing the phenomenon known as the “collaborative,” “sharing,” or “gig” economy.  This phenomenon relies on crowdsourcing, a term coined by Jeff Howe of Wired magazine in 2006 to describe a business model in which online providers (platforms) outsource everything from project financing to the performance of specific tasks to large groups of individuals (crowds).  Examples of crowdsourcing platforms disrupting established business models include Uber and Lyft (taxi services) and airbnb (hotels).  Jeff Bezos, the CEO of Amazon.com, has stated that it is his ambition to use the provision of “humans as a service,” his term for crowdsourcing, to disrupt all types of conventional industries.

From the consumer’s perspective, the sharing economy offers several advantages, notably more providers of services at a lower cost, and the opportunity to incentivize better service through rating systems.  From the service provider’s perspective, the sharing economy also offers concrete benefits, such as the possibility of earning extra income, greater flexibility in the scheduling of work, and the opportunity to be one’s own boss by becoming a “micro-entrepreneur.”  However, as Prof. Prassl noted, the sharing economy is analogous to an iceberg.  The benefits are readily apparent on the surface, but hidden dangers lurk below the waterline.

The biggest downside of the sharing economy for service providers is that there is no guarantee that steady work will be available when needed.  Even when work is available, competition may drive down the price that providers can charge.  Thus micro-entrepreneurs may find themselves working long hours for low, unpredictable pay.  Micro-entrepreneurs also face legal uncertainties.  Will they be eligible for workers’ compensation if they are injured while performing a gig?  Not if they are classified as independent contractors, rather than employees.  What about liability insurance for negligent acts?  Most individual auto insurance policies don’t provide coverage when an Uber driver uses her vehicle to carry passengers for hire.

Consumers also face hidden downsides.  Rating systems are subject to manipulation and don’t guarantee good service.  In addition, platform owners, such as Uber, almost always require users to not to hold them liable for the negligence or fraudulent conduct of service providers as a condition of downloading the platform owner’s app.  Few users bother to read this fine print before downloading.  Consequently, a platform user who is injured or defrauded by a service provider may have no recourse other than to sue the service provider as an individual, rather than the platform owner with the deeper pockets.  If the service provider isn’t covered by liability insurance, there is a real danger that he may turn out to be judgment-proof.

Platform owners insist that they should not be subject to conventional employment laws because their new technologies are transformative.  Uber, for example, is actively lobbying to exempt itself from being subject to minimum wage and unemployment insurance laws.  Professor Prassl contends that, from a legal perspective, “gigs,” “tasks,” and “orders” are indistinguishable from conventional employment.  The technology may be novel, but the issues that it raises are not new.

The sharing economy can be seen as the continuation of longstanding trend among employers to shift more and more risks on to workers.  Individuals may find themselves working almost non-stop during periods of high demand, or risk being dropped by platform owners if they fail to make themselves available, and then go for long stretches with little or no work when demand is low.  Thus fluctuations in the business cycle are now born by workers rather than employers.  These practices undermines the conventional social contract whereby employers make long-term commitments to employees, providing them with a steady income and benefits, in return for a stable, better trained, and more highly motivated workforce.

Moving forward, the challenge will be to bring the new employment opportunities created by the sharing economy within the legal framework of conventional employment law.  Platform owners need not be required to provide the same level of legal protections and benefits to service providers that would be expected of a conventional employer, but some baseline level of protections and benefits should be required in order to create a more level playing field among conventional businesses and novel service providers.